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Abstract
In December 2008, the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism, released a report, World At Risk. The Report points to the fact that,
not only is the use of a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist attack before the end of 2013,
more likely than not, but also to the fact that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and
use biological weapons than nuclear. This paper examines the recommendations of the report in
the context of the historic and geopolitical changes, in particular globalization. The authors highlight
the "dual-use" dilemma, as described in the report, as the paradoxical use of technology developed
for the benefit of mankind being used for sinister purposes. The mitigation of such a threat lies in
broad stakeholder involvement and cooperation, including non-state actors, governments and the
bio-tech industry itself. The importance of vigilance measures within the life science community is
emphasized and, the authors propose, could include a web-based didactic course in bioterrorism
and weapons of mass destruction identification. The site could outline safety protocols, have
detailed disaster management tutorials, and could be specifically tailored for different subsets of
industry and health professionals. The paper concludes with an endorsement of a multi-pronged
approach including strong international guidelines and intelligence cooperation and preparatory
measures such as the wide-spread use of detection systems as well as diagnostic decision support
systems for bioterrorism detection at the local level.
Introduction
The US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (The Com-
mission), was established in 2007 by the Congress of the
United States in House Resolution 1 (P.L. 110-53) to
assess and provide a clear and comprehensive strategy and
concrete recommendations for prevention activities, initi-
atives, and programs. In December 2008, the Commis-
sion released a report, World At Risk, addressing these
objectives. The Report's findings received considerable
press coverage in the United States and internationally, in
part because of the dire prediction that "it is more likely
than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used
in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
2013", and that "terrorists are more likely to be able to
obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear
weapon" [1]. The bold prediction that an attack with a
WMD is likely somewhere in the world by the end of 2013
was arguably not substantiated in the text of the report,
potentially fueling the discussion that the biological
weapon threat is exaggerated [2]. This issue will not be
addressed in this paper. Throughout the Report, many
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questions were posed that lie squarely at the intersection
of globalization and health. In this paper, we aim to
address the following questions: Firstly, how will the bio-
science revolution change the nature of the biological
weapons threat? And which levers and interventions
might best mitigate the risk of such an attack?  
The bioscience revolution
The Commission posed many questions, one of which
was how in the future will the bioscience revolution and the glo-
balization of the biotechnology industry change the nature of
the biological weapons threat? The biotechnology revolution
discussed herein began in 1973, 20 years after Watson &
Crick's sentinel paper describing the structure of DNA,
when Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert
Boyer of the University of California-San Francisco discov-
ered the basic technique for recombinant DNA [3,4]. In
the subsequent years, dramatic advances in information
technology and processing power helped to spur the rise
of many biotechnology companies, principally centered
around large research universities within the San Fran-
cisco and Boston areas [3]. Presently, thousands of bio-
technology companies exist in the United States and
throughout the world. This international expansion was
driven by a host of factors, such as the growing use of
international subcontracting and technological coopera-
tion agreements, including biodefense-related research
and vaccine development [5].
A role for the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries
The World at Risk Report addresses the role of the biotech-
nology and pharmaceutical industries in addressing the
biological weapons threat, and advocates that the United
States Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) press for an international conference of countries
with major biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
to discuss the norms and safeguards necessary to keep
dangerous pathogens out of the hands of terrorists, and to
ensure that the global revolution in the life sciences
unfolds safely and securely. Given the vital role that the
industries could play in an attack with regards to vaccine
dissemination and education, this is a reasonable recom-
mendation; but to have any value the safeguards will
require clearly delineated, verifiable safety guidelines with
significant sanctions for non-compliance. However, the
question of who will regulate the safeguards needs to be
addressed. Governmental regulation, through unan-
nounced site visits and investigations would be preferred
over self-regulation, particularly if there is a threat of sanc-
tions for non-compliance.
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, govern-
mental agencies (such as the NIH/NSF in the US), and
foundations play a critical role in funding life sciences
research, particularly in universities. We propose that
obtaining grants and continued funding for life sciences
research should be made contingent upon proof of adher-
ence to biosafety protocols. This would serve the dual-
purpose of increasing the chance of adherence to proto-
cols, while concurrently sensitizing researchers to biosecu-
rity issues. However, this would have little impact inside
of the private sector. Working to ensure that the global
revolution in the life sciences unfolds safety is a worth-
while goal, but it would likely prove to be extraordinarily
difficult to implement given the issues of regulation,
enforcement, and the "dual-use" issues arising in biotech-
nology.
The dual-use dilemma
The World at Risk report addresses the 'dual-use dilemma'
of biotechnology, stating that: "at the same time that [bio-
technology] has benefited humanity by enabling
advances in medicine and agriculture, it has also increased
the availability of pathogens and technologies that can be
used for sinister purposes" [1]. Emerging technologies
and machine automation of complex molecular biologi-
cal processes has made it easier to synthesize long strands
of DNA coding for genes and even entire microbial
genomes. By piecing together large fragments of genetic
material synthesized in the laboratory, it is possible to
assemble highly virulent infectious viruses. At this junc-
ture this process would be technically challenging, expen-
sive, and unreliable. However, as DNA synthesis and
manipulation technologies continue to advance at a rapid
pace, it will soon be possible to synthesize nearly any
virus whose DNA sequence has been decoded [1].
Chyba and Greninger note that experiments performed
and published over the last decade-ranging from the
incorporation of immune-suppressing interleukin-4 (IL-
4) into the mousepox virus to create a deadlier virus able
to infect vaccinated animals, to the ability to synthesize
viruses from scratch using chemicals on the open market-
already demonstrate that the technological know-how to
construct dangerous pathogens is widespread [5]. This
highlights the dual-use dilemma. Attempting to ban these
technologies or stifle technology transfer is not a viable or
reasonable option. It is necessary therefore to design pol-
icies that can concurrently suppress biological weapons
development whilst accommodating and encouraging the
spread of dual use technologies for technical and scientific
advancement by the life sciences community [6-9].
The life sciences community
The life sciences community -defined as universities, medical
and veterinary schools, nongovernmental biomedical research
institutes, trade associations, and biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical companies- has an important role to play in miti-
gating the bioterrorism threat. The World at Risk ReportGlobalization and Health 2009, 5:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/5/1/3
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states that the life sciences community must foster a "bot-
tom-up effort to sensitize researchers to biosecurity issues
and concerns, and to strive to design and conduct experi-
ments in a way that minimizes safety and security risks"
[1]. It is paramount that the life sciences community
works toward increased cooperation with intelligence
agencies, while concurrently working towards fostering an
increased awareness of potential threats at the design
phase of experiments. To address the Commission's rec-
ommendation of sensitizing researchers to biosecurity
issues, we propose the development of a web-based didac-
tic course in bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) identification and treatment for the life
sciences community. The site could outline safety proto-
cols, have detailed disaster management tutorials, and
could be specifically tailored for different subsets of
industry and health professionals including: researchers,
medical/veterinary students, graduate students in the bio-
logical and life sciences, amongst others. Furthermore, to
provide an educational resource for the public, we pro-
pose that the biotechnology and/or pharmaceutical
industry, as a demonstration of corporate social responsi-
bility, create a pictorial-based patient-centered web inter-
face designed to educate the public and optimize and
coordinate use of emergency services in the event of a bio-
terrorism attack.
The growing threat of non-state actors
Intelligence estimates appear to agree that the acquisition
and dissemination of deadly pathogens would entail
fewer hurdles than the theft or production of weapons-
grade uranium or plutonium and its assembly into an
improvised nuclear device, thus rendering the biological
weapons threat greater than the nuclear threat in this
respect [1]. With the growing threat of non-state actors
obtaining biological weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, over the past five years the international com-
munity has launched initiatives to address it. These
include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and UN
Security Council Resolution 1540, which were created in
2004 to ensure that states prohibit non-state actors from
manufacturing, acquiring or obtaining materials that
could support the use of biological or chemical weapons
[9,10]. Initiatives have also been launched from the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Interna-
tional Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) [11]. While there are still significant techni-
cal hurdles that terrorist groups would need to surpass to
be able to weaponize biological agents, synthetic genom-
ics, machine automation of complex molecular biological
processes, and a flurry of emerging technologies will make
this barrier easier to cross. Furthermore, the Commission
found that terrorist groups could upgrade their capabili-
ties by recruiting scientists adept in these technologies.
This highlights the importance of fostering a culture of
sensitivity to biosecurity issues within the life sciences
community, as well as the importance of increasing com-
munication between the life science and intelligence com-
munities.
Biological weapons convention
The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), entered
into force March 26, 1975, has greater than 160 nation-
state signatories and provides a multilateral control of the
stockpiling and spread of weapons technology. The World
at Risk report recommends that an action plan for achiev-
ing universal adherence to and effective national imple-
mentation of the BWC be proposed for adoption at the
next review conference in 2011. This is a worthwhile goal,
particularly if one believes that those who seek to use bio-
logical weapons against a civilian population are likely to
obtain the pathogens by stealing them or by recruiting sci-
entists from state-funded programs. However, due to the
dual-use nature of biotechnology materials, verification of
adherence by a regulatory body or other means remains
difficult, if not impossible.
The difficulty is verifying the BWC was highlighted in
2001, when the United States withdrew its support for a
draft Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Protocol, in
part because they felt it created the false perception that a
biological weapons program could be effectively verified
by an international organization [1]. Furthermore, devel-
oping nations expressed concern that export controls
from the protocol discriminated against them. Since
2003, BWC signatories have held annual expert and polit-
ical meetings to discuss BWC related domestic legislation,
pathogen security, and other issues, and are scheduled to
hold review conferences every five years, with the next
review conference scheduled for 2011. The continued
spread of biotechnology information and materials in the
period since the last conference makes it very likely that
export controls in developing nations, verification of
BWC adherence and the dual-use issue will need to be
addressed at the upcoming conference.
Export controls
Export controls have been employed to mitigate the
impact of exports on the development of WMDs with lim-
ited success. Examples of such organizations include the
Australia Group, an informal forum of countries which,
through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to
ensure that exports do not contribute to the development
of chemical or biological weapons; and the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, signed by 33
nations on July 12, 1996, to suppress the hostile applica-
tion of dual-use technologies [9]. The Australia Group
does not include many of the strategically importantGlobalization and Health 2009, 5:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/5/1/3
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developing nations with burgeoning biotechnology
industries; and the Wassenaar Arrangement was described
by Keller & Nolan as having received scant attention from
the policy community and ridicule from the arms lobby
because it has "no teeth" [12].
Levers and interventions
Bioterrorism is a central issue at the interface of globaliza-
tion and health. This is the result of the globalization of
the biotechnology industry, the global spread of biotech-
nology materials and information, the changing nature of
global travel, as well as the ability of infectious diseases to
spread worldwide and have a crippling economic impact.
Below are the recommendations from the World at Risk
Report discussed in this paper, in addition to proposed
levers and interventions.
International Biotechnology Conference
We concur with the Report's recommendation for an
international conference of countries with major biotech-
nology and pharmaceutical industries to discuss the
norms and safeguards necessary to keep dangerous patho-
gens out of the hands of terrorists and to ensure that the
global revolution in the life sciences unfolds safely and
securely. To be effective, the following should be met:
▪ Safeguards must be clearly delineated and verifiable
▪ Significant sanctions for non-compliance need to be put
in place to ensure adherence
▪ Governmental enforcement is preferred over self-regula-
tion
▪ Funding for life sciences research should be made con-
tingent to adherence to safeguards
Life science community
To address the Report's recommendation that the life sci-
ences community foster a bottom-up effort to sensitize
researchers to biosecurity issues and concerns, and to
strive to design and conduct experiments in a way that
minimizes safety and security risks", the following should
be addressed:
▪ Increased cooperation between the life sciences and
intelligence communities
▪ Address and minimize bioterrorism threats at the design
phase of experiments
▪ Develop a web-based didactic course in bioterrorism and
disaster management with detailed safety protocols.
▪ Course should be compulsory for all students and post-
doctoral fellows in biological and life science training
▪ Tailor the course for industry and health professionals,
medical/veterinary students, and graduate students in the
biological and life sciences
▪ Develop pictorial-based patient-centered web interface
designed to optimize and coordinate use of emergency
services in the event of a bioterrorism attack.
Policy Interventions
The World at Risk report recommends that an action plan
for achieving universal adherence to and effective national
implementation of the BWC be proposed for adoption at
the next review conference in 2011. With regards to the
review conference:
▪ The dual-use nature of biotechnology materials will
make verification of adherence to safety protocols by a
regulatory body or other means critically difficult.
▪ Export controls need to be addressed to ensure that
developing nations are not penalized
▪ Immigration and visa policies need to be reevaluated,
particularly for students in the life sciences
▪ Strengthen the communication between intelligence
agencies and major research universities
Conclusion
In December 2008, the US Commission on the Preven-
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism released a report, World At Risk, reporting that
"it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruc-
tion will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013", and that "terrorists are more
likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon
than a nuclear weapon." A myriad of economic, technical
and political factors are contributing to the elusive and
rapidly evolving nature of the biological weapons threat.
The dual-use nature of biotechnology and the globaliza-
tion of the biotechnology industry has made regulation of
materials that can be used for biological weapons prolif-
eration cost-prohibitively expensive and laborious. Fur-
thermore, biological weapons programs can be easily
concealed, making regulation by an International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)-type regulatory body dedicated to
biological weapons detection and materials management
equally difficult to implement. As a result, a multi-
pronged approach must be employed to address the bio-
logical weapons threat. Strong international guidelines
and intelligence cooperation needs to be complemented
by national and local enforcement. Preventative measures
and preparatory measures need to be implemented, such
as the wide-spread use of detection systems including aer-
osol sampling, particulate counters and biomass indica-
tors as well as diagnostic decision support systems forPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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bioterrorism detection at the local level [13]. Such a
multi-pronged approach is necessary to address this criti-
cal national security imperative at the intersection of glo-
balization and health.
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